Sunday, September 25, 2016

A motion-less actuator does not confirm a hydraulic system is energy-less

I received a call from the owner of a fleet of refuse trucks.
He called me because he had concerns about the safety of his mechanics as it relates to the hydraulic systems on his fleet of refuse trucks. 
Here is an overview of our discussion:
The truck’s trash compactors are powered by hydraulic systems. His mechanics have to get inside the compactors to perform cleanup, maintenance and repair work. They also have to perform service and repair work on the vehicle's hydraulic systems. He felt that the safety instructions in the vehicle's service manual about making it safe for workers to work inside the compactor, or work on the hydraulic system, were vague. He apparently decided to call the manufacturer to get clarification on the issue. The manufacturers' representative, with whom he discussed the issue, advised him to have the company’s workers follow the steps provided in the vehicle's service manual, which are:
1. Shut off the engine.
2. Activate the compactor's control valve moving it back-and-forth while observing the compactor. If the compactor does not respond (move) while the control valve is being shifted back-and-forth, it is safe for a worker to enter the compactor.
3. If the compactor does respond (move) when the control valve is being shifted back-and-forth continue operating the control valve until the compactor stops moving. When it no longer moves when the control valve is shifted back and forth, it is safe for a worker to enter the compactor.

He asked the manufacturer's representative if there was a possibility there could be stored energy in the hydraulic system even though the compactor does not move when shifting the control valve back-and-forth. He said he had no reason to believe this could happen. He also mentioned the company had no record of any incidents related to his concerns. He asked if there was any way workers could confirm, beyond the fact the compactor did not move, if there is stored energy in the hydraulic system. He said no, and added that he "didn't think it was necessary."

The owner added that he was concerned that the hydraulic system could possibly have stored energy despite the fact that the engine was shut off, and workers had followed the safety recommendations in the vehicle's service manual. 

One of the statements made by the refuse truck manufacturer’s representative when asked by the truck owner if there is a possibility there could be stored energy in the hydraulic system even though the compactor no longer moved when shifting the control back and forth is particularly disturbing. He answered that he had “no reason to believe this could happen” without offering advice as to making certain it could not move.
     
I told the refuse truck owner that he had good reason to be concerned. I advised him that although a hydraulic actuator (cylinder or motor) does not respond when the control valve is activated, DOES NOT mean a hydraulic system does not contain stored energy, nor does it mean the actuator will not move unexpectedly, for the following reasons:

1. An actuator will not move below a certain pressure threshold because there is not enough force to overcome the load.  
2. There could be debris in slides, rollers, and/or concealed areas, which can prevent the compactor from moving. When a mechanic moves it may lurch forwards/backwards.
3. Compactor out of alignment, which causes it to bind.
4. Control valve is pilot-operated, which means it only functions when the pump is operating.
5. Wiring problem with a solenoid controlled control valve, which prevents it from shifting the valve.
6. Control valve seized: hydraulic system remains energized even though compactor remains stationary when valve is activated.
7. Control cable broken but break not visible.
8. Untrained person shifts the incorrect control valve.
9. Debris causes sliding mechanism to jam. Prevents compactor from moving when valve is activated, and does not release the stored hydraulic energy.
10. Pressure low due to internal wear. Sufficient pressure to cause injury, but not sufficient to move compactor.
11. Cylinder port relief valve malfunction: will not move cylinder in one direction, but cannot move in the opposite direction because rod is fully extended or retracted.
12. The actuator is equipped with load holding valves, i.e. counterbalance or pilot-operated check valves. Will not permit actuator to move if pump is shut off.

Regrettably, the same rules that apply to electrical safety do not apply to hydraulic safety even though, in this instance, the situation is, for all intents and purposes, identical. For example, if an electrician turns a light switch on and the light fails to illuminate, the electrician does not have to rely on guesswork to determine if the circuit is “dead.” A simple check with a voltmeter will confirm the situation. Regrettably, even though the hydraulic industry has the instruments needed to confirm whether or not a hydraulic system stores energy after shutdown, machinery and equipment designers typically don’t design them into hydraulic systems because it adds cost. Needless to say, OSHA ignores the problem.

When it comes to hydraulic systems don’t look to OSHA for help:
Regrettably, even though by law, workers must undergo energy control training (OSHA's lockout/tagout training), which includes information about the safe release of stored hydraulic energy, and protecting workers from the unexpected movement of equipment, OSHA ignores the fact that over 99% of the hydraulic systems operating in the USA do not have the means to either verify if a hydraulic system contains stored energy, or to safely remove/release it if a system does contain stored energy. Moreover, OSHA does not hold machinery and equipment manufacturers accountable for designing hydraulic systems, which are inherently unsafe by design from the point of view of stored hydraulic energy.

Hydraulic systems are particularly hazardous when it comes to stored energy, because, unlike electrical systems, where if a breaker is isolated the entire circuit is de-energized, a hydraulic system, depending on its magnitude and complexity, can store energy in numerous "zones," or "pockets." Therefore to make a hydraulic system safe to work on, a worker has to know where every potential energy "zone" is, and has to be able to safely remove the stored energy from each zone.


Here is my advice regarding this matter:
Get it in writing: If the refuse truck manufacturer, or any machine manufacturer for that matter, is confident that the safety procedures in the vehicle’s service manual are fail-safe, i.e., guarantees, without a shadow of a doubt, that if a worker follows the safety instructions provided in the service manual with respect to working inside the compactor, and performing service, repair, and maintenance work on the vehicle’s hydraulic system, they will have no problem with setting your mind at ease by giving it to you in writing.

The document must be formalized on the company’s letterhead, and signed by the company’s safety manager, and engineer. I further advise you to discuss with the manufacturer the need to install some type of mechanism that prevents the compactor from unexpectedly moving while a worker is performing work on same. Also, I highly recommend you refrain from allowing a worker to perform invasive work on the vehicle’s hydraulic system until such time as the manufacturer has assured you the hydraulic system is completely free of stored energy after following the recommended pre-work safety procedures.

Warning:
This general warning should be posted on ALL hydraulic systems:

WARNING: Performing a lockout/tagout in accordance with OSHA’s lockout and tagout protocols DOES NOT make a hydraulic system safe to work on. If, after isolating the power supply, a hydraulic actuator (cylinder or motor) does not respond when the directional control valve is activated, IT DOES NOT CONFIRM the hydraulic system cannot operate. You MUST verify if there is stored energy in the hydraulic system, and if there is, you must remove it safely. Also, a hydraulic system can store energy in numerous places. You MUST insure ALL “pockets” of stored energy are isolated.
Failure to follow this warning could cause an accident that can lead to severe injury, death, and/or severe property damage.

Have a question about a hydraulic safety matter, I will be happy to give you my opinion?


NOTE: I will never use your name or your company’s name in my response.

Saturday, September 24, 2016

OSHA "talks the talk" when it comes to stored hydraulic energy, but continues to ignore the "elephant in the room."

Here is a report of yet another mechanic that suffered a debilitating oil injection injury but, as usual, the mechanic, not the machine designer, shoulders the blame:



Here are the ridiculous, and unrealistic, statements under sub-heading “Recommendations.”

“At the time of the repair, the mechanic had not consulted the specific manual for this machine to determine the proper procedure to dissipate oil pressure throughout the system.”

FACT: There were no procedures in the manual for dissipating oil pressure in the system.

“During the accident investigation, the manual still could not be located. As increased technology has complicated shut-down procedures (the addition of hydraulic accumulators for example), no assumptions can be made, and a generic shut-down procedure should not be trusted.”

FACT: There is no such a thing as a “generic shutdown procedure” for a hydraulic system.

“Machine-specific owners’ manuals should be readily available and consulted prior to undertaking repairs.”

FACT: Machine specific owners’ manuals DO NOT provide information about how to determine if, after shutdown, a hydraulic system contains stored energy. Moreover, even if a person could determine if a hydraulic system contains a lethal amount of stored energy, there is no safe way to remove it.

“When searching for hydraulic leaks and servicing charged systems, heavy gloves will provide additional protection for the hands.”

FACT: There are no gloves currently available that will protect a worker from an oil injection injury.

This accident epitomizes the disparity between OSHA's standard (Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) (29 CFR 1910.147), and the reality of the situation.

Here are a few excerpts from OSHA’s Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) 29 CFR 1910.147:

• This standard covers the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment in which the unexpected energization or start up of the machines or equipment, or release of stored energy, could harm employees. This standard establishes minimum performance requirements for the control of such hazardous energy.

FACT: Less than 1% of the hydraulic systems operating in the USA meet the minimum performance requirements for the control of hydraulic energy.

• This standard applies to the control of energy during servicing and/or maintenance of machines and equipment.

FACT: The standard may apply to other forms of energy, but it in no way, shape, or form applies to hydraulic energy.

• Energy control program. The employer shall establish a program consisting of energy control procedures, employee training and periodic inspections to ensure that before any employee performs any servicing or maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected energizing, startup or release of stored energy could occur and cause injury, the machine or equipment shall be isolated from the energy source and rendered inoperative.

FACT: Not only do ALL employers fail to establish a program consisting of energy control procedures for hydraulic systems, they couldn’t even if they wanted to, because hydraulic systems are not designed to facilitate the controlled release of stored energy.

• How do I know if the OSHA standard applies to me?
If your employees service or maintain machines where the unexpected startup, energization, or the release of stored energy could cause injury, the standard likely applies to you.

FACT: The standard does apply to you if you work on hydraulic systems. As you can see from this accident, you and your colleagues are highly susceptible to this type of accident because both your employer, and OSHA, ignore the problem.

• The standard applies to all sources of energy, including, but not limited to: mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, chemical, and thermal energy.

FACT: While OSHA’s Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) 29 CFR 1910.147 applies to all sources of energy, including hydraulic energy, both your employer, and OSHA, ignore the fact that less then 1% of the hydraulic systems operating in the USA, Canada, Australia, Europe, et al, can be de-energized after shut down.

My recommendation: NEVER loosen a hydraulic connector, or remove a hydraulic component, unless you can verify if the hydraulic system you are working on contains stored energy. In all likelihood it does, and there is no safe way to remove it.

Since your employer and OSHA ignore the problem, the only thing left for you to do, is to refuse to work on a hydraulic system if you have any doubt that it contains stored energy.

Here is a video of an accident I filmed while conducting a hydraulic cylinder performance test:


The accident is identical to subject accident in which the victim suffered an oil injection injury.  The victim in this accident performed the identical procedure described in the subject accident. As you can see from the video, the victim was fortunate in that the explosion was deflected toward the machine’s cab.

Post accident I installed a Safe-T-Bleed connector in the line, and repeated the procedure. The lowest pressure I could achieve after following the manufacturers‘ (Doosan) recommendations, was 500-PSI: a pressure well into the territory that could cause you to suffer a debilitating oil injection injury, and even cause you to lose your life.

The information in this blog applies to ALL industrial and mobile hydraulic systems - no exceptions! Before you work on any hydraulic system, read the respective manufacturers’ warnings about the consequences of discharging high-pressure hydraulic oil to atmosphere. Then, ask the respective manufacturer’s engineering department to write your company a letter stating that post shut down the entire hydraulic system on machine model XXXX de-energizes, and is thus completely safe to work on. Until you receive the letter, keep your hands, eyes and body away from hydraulic systems!


I share because I care.

Saturday, September 17, 2016

Is a Forklift a Safe Substitute for an Aerial Platform?

Is a Forklift a Safe Substitute for an Aerial Platform?
Regulatory groups and manufacturers have developed, what they refer to as, “safe” methods for lifting personnel with a forklift (ref. OSHA 1926.602) – or if you will, “licensing” forklift owners and operators to use their forklifts as “crossover” vehicles, i.e. in addition to transporting cargo, they can be used as “aerial platforms.”

These experts did however make a few stipulations, some of which are extremely vague:
  1. The work platform must be equipped with standard guardrails or equivalent means, and must be firmly secured to the lifting carriage or forks.
  2. The hydraulic system must be designed such that the lift mechanism will not drop faster than 135 feet per minute in the event of a failure in any part of the system.
  3. The operator must be in the driving seat while workers are on the platform.
  4. The operator must be in the driving seat while raising or lowering the platform.
  5. The forklift must not travel from point to point with the work platform elevated at a height greater than 4 feet while the platform is occupied. When necessary, an occupied platform can be moved as long as the forklift is “inched” at a very low speed.
  6. The area between the personnel on the platform and the mast must be guarded to prevent contact with chains or other pinch points. 

The preceding stipulations are well-founded. However, could the regulatory groups and manufacturers have overlooked a number of critical elements associated with forklift design and ownership, which could either cause, or contribute to, the uncontrolled descent of a forklift’s lift or tilt mechanisms while the mast is elevated and thus cause a person to suffer severe injury or death?

1. From a design point of view comparing a forklift to an aerial platform is akin to comparing apples and basketballs.

A forklift (also referred to as a lift truck, fork truck, or a forklift truck is a powered industrial truck used to lift and transport goods short distances.
In stark contrast to a forklift, an aerial work platform (AWP), also known as an aerial device, elevating work platform (EWP), or mobile elevating work platform (MEWP) is a mechanical device used to provide workers temporary access to inaccessible areas, which are usually at an elevation higher than ground level.

Both forklifts and aerial platforms share similar hydraulic components from an operational point of view. However, an aerial platform designer has an additional design responsibility, i.e., to insure the “platform” is fail-safe from every point of view while it is being used within the operating guidelines defined by the respective aerial platform manufacturer.

Needless to say, an aerial platform has a number of hydraulic “safety valves,” which are not usually incorporated in a conventional forklift’s hydraulic system design. Without these critical safety devices, any vehicle, forklift or otherwise, is inherently unsafe for purpose of elevating and/or transporting personnel. Moreover, forklift manufacturers aren’t shy about warning of the consequences of using their products for this purpose.

There are always inherent risks associated with riding “outside the confines of a mobile vehicle’s frame.”

Forklifts do not have redundant safety components and/or systems for the specific purpose of protecting the “rider” in the event of the unexpected failure of a critical hydraulic or mechanical component.

On the other hand, aerial platform designers focus very heavily on platform reliability and machine stability, which makes safety the nucleus of aerial platform design.

Accordingly, aerial platforms do have redundant safety components/systems for the specific purpose of protecting the “rider” in the event of the unexpected failure of a critical hydraulic component.

What the regulatory groups and manufacturers have apparently done is to give industry permission to use a forklift as a “crossover” vehicle, i.e., in addition to using it to move goods around the warehouse, it can also double as an aerial platform.

Unfortunately, due to conventional forklift design objectives, a forklift without substantial modifications to the hydraulic system, cannot perform the latter with any guarantee of safety, and thus, there are, and always will be, inherent risks associated with using a forklift for any purpose other than what it was specifically designed to do, i.e., transport goods.

2. Education and training – arguably the weakest link! -

The issue of forklift safety extends beyond the boundaries of forklift design. It relies heavily on the qualifications and training of forklift maintenance personnel.

The most powerful argument against using a forklift as an aerial platform has to do with the education and training – or the lack thereof – of maintenance personnel.

Equally as critical is the poor state of maintenance, in general, in the forklift industry. These issues will be addressed separately.

Safe and predictable forklift operation (Ref. OSHA 29CFR1910.178O) can only be achieved if a forklift is expertly maintained.

The safe and efficient operation of any machine can only be realized through the implementation and execution of a world-class proactive maintenance program, which is only effective if executed by well-trained technicians; one cannot exist without the other!

It is virtually impossible to meet these requirements if the people who are responsible for performing the maintenance services are untrained - especially on critical systems like hydraulics.

Ironically, over 98% of the people in the U.S. who maintain, service, and, repair hydraulic systems and components are not properly trained.

OSHA has passed a law (ref. OSHA 29CFR1910.1780) that makes it mandatory for a forklift operator to be certified in the safe operation of a forklift. Moreover, the law requires them to receive both hands-on and formal classroom training.

Ironically, the people who have the lion’s share of responsibility for the safe and proper operation of a forklift - the mechanics - are completely ignored by all regulatory groups, including the owners and operators of forklifts.

So, why aren’t mechanics held to the same standard as operators? Moreover, why do the regulatory groups and manufacturers “look the other way” with respect to the training and certification of mechanics?

“Flying” is a relative term! -
An airplane and an aerial platform share a fundamental similarity – they both “fly” people!
To avoid an unimaginable toll on human life due to crashes born of poor repair and maintenance practices brought about by untrained personnel, the federal government – the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) – passed into law a bill that made it a federal crime for untrained/unauthorized personnel to perform any service or repair work on an airplane. The “flying public” feels safe thanks to “Uncle Sam.”

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the aerial platform industry – it’s a veritable “free-for-all.” Literally anyone, regardless of training or experience, is permitted to service and repair all types of personnel lifting mechanisms – including forklifts, cranes, basket trucks, amusement park rides, etc.
When a person is elevated by means of a forklift, basket-truck, or an aerial platform, that person is, for all intents and purposes, “flying.” Ironically, the life and limb of these “pilots” is generally in the hands of people who have little or no training!

Needless to say there has to be a reason why the regulatory groups and manufacturers – the people whom never in the course of their work have to risk their lives “flying” these unreliable and unsafe machines – cow-towed to corporate America and allowed them to make a forklift a “crossover” vehicle. Could the reason be green in nature – money?

The vast majority of people who maintain, service, and repair forklifts, and especially forklift hydraulic systems, have absolutely no formal training. This leaves the majority of forklifts, regardless of how much training the operator receives, highly susceptible to accidents, which could result in severe injury, death, or substantial property damage.

In my opinion, the regulatory organizations and manufacturers made a very serious oversight when they ignored a critical aspect of safe and reliable forklift operation – the mechanic.

3. Forklifts are generally “maintained” on the basis of “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it.” -

Needless to say, the quality and consistency of any maintenance program cannot rise above the level of competence of the maintenance workforce, or maintenance management, for that matter.
Another compelling reason why a forklift should never be used to elevate personnel – the maintenance is less than adequate!

Here are just a few of the problems:
  1. The vast majority of forklifts operate on the basis of “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it!” In a nutshell, forklift maintenance is generally performed on the basis of “crisis management!” They are typically “run into the ground” and only then do they get the attention they need – maybe! Repairs are seldom properly done because maintenance personnel are generally not empowered to make decisions on the quality of their work. Supervisors usually dictate how repairs are executed with the main objectives being cost and time rather than quality and reliability!
  2. Less than 1% of the hydraulic components on a forklift are removed on a proactive maintenance basis. The forklift industry operates on the basis of “run-to-fail (RTF).
    NOTE: This problem is not unique to the forklift industry. The vast majority of hydraulic systems operating in plants and on mobile machines operate on the basis of “run-to-fail.”
  3. When a forklift is “sidelined” due to an unexpected problem, production is usually unaffected.   Besides, most plants have a “fleet” of forklifts – there is usually a backup. If all else fails a telephone call to the local rental facility solves the problem.

Maintenance and production supervisors and managers are usually well aware of their options so their attention is focused on the “squeaky wheel” syndrome.

Maintenance supervisors and mechanics are usually so busy “putting out fires” on production machines that little time is left to schedule service on the “non-critical production machines” such as forklifts!

4. Forklifts are generally very badly abused. -

A visit to most truck loading facilities is tantamount to visiting a forklift proving ground. Forklift operators routinely “spin the tires,” select reverse (or forward) while the vehicle is traveling in the opposite direction, overload, etc.

Most forklifts exhibit severe body damage from constant collisions with whatever is in their respective paths. In short, a forklift is arguably one of the most neglected and abused machines in a plant.

The term “unreliable” is synonymous with neglect. Neglected machinery will inevitably break down unexpectedly. These aren’t the types of machines electricians, painters, pipe fitters, etc., should be “flying” in the course of doing their respective jobs.

5. OSHA’s “135 feet per minute” descent rate rule for failure to “any part of the system” is, in my opinion, preposterous. –

“Weaknesses” in forklift design, makes them relatively safe for transporting cargo, but inherently unsafe as “work platforms.”

According to OSHA regulation (ref. 29CFR1910.178) a forklift may be used to lift personnel on condition that the user follows a number of guidelines. One of those guidelines being, “the lift mechanism will not drop faster than 135 feet per minute in the event of a failure in any part of the system.”

This rule is baseless because it is impossible to control the descent rate of the lift mechanism “in the event of a failure in any part of the system.”

Here a few examples (Figure 1) of failures which could lead to the “unrestricted” descent of a forklift’s lift mechanism:
1. Lift chain failure
2. Cylinder retaining pin failure
3. Cylinder internal seal failure
4. Cylinder rod failure
5. Mast guide wear-plate wear.
6. Hose failure.




There are also additional factors that could cause an accident, such as brake failure, inattentive operator, etc.

NOTE: The vast majority of these types of failures are caused by poor/inadequate maintenance training, substandard/non-existent service and repair, and/or forklift abuse.

6. Rider’s life is in forklift driver's hands! -

Another distinct disadvantage of using a forklift as an aerial platform is the fact that the “rider’s” life is in the hands of the forklift driver. An inattentive driver can cause the rider to "suffer" numerous types of accidents, which could lead to severe injury or death.
A conventional aerial platform is designed to permit the “rider” to control all vehicle functions including wheel drive and steering.

CASE HISTORY:
An electrician asked the forklift driver to hoist him to the ceiling to attend to a defective light, which was at an elevation of approximately 20 feet from the factory floor. He used a pallet as a work platform.

The driver was sitting in the forklift receiving instructions from the electrician. While the electrician was busy attending to the light, the forklift driver apparently struck up a conversation with a colleague.

A short while later, the electrician shouted to the forklift driver to lower him to the ground. The driver, without looking up, responded by activating the lever to lower the platform. However, he continued with the conversation.

A minute or so went by and the electrician repeated his request for the driver to lower him to the ground.

This prompted the driver to glance forward. To his horror, the lift mechanism’s cylinder rod was completely lowered while the platform remained aloft.

The forklift driver, realizing the gravity of the situation, (the slightest movement could cause the platform to come crashing down) immediately activated the control valve hoping to raise the cylinder rod to meet the platform.

Unfortunately, the electrician became impatient and turned around to see why the operator was not responding to his commands. His moving caused the mast sections to realign. The driver watched in horror as the platform came crashing down to the concrete floor below (Figure 2).

As a result of the fall the electrician suffered severe back injury and multiple bruises.
NOTE:
On certain forklift models mast wear guides can wear out and cause the mast section(s) to temporarily seize while the lift-mechanism is at maximum elevation. This situation can leave the “rider” vulnerable to a serious “free-fall” accident because the lift-mechanism’s lift cylinder(s) can lower independently of the lift-mechanism.

The OSHA “descent-rate” rule appears to apply to all forklifts regardless of type, age, or condition. Most forklifts do not have hydraulic safety valves (velocity fuses) integrated in the lower port of the mast cylinder(s). Consequently a hose failure, for whatever reason, can cause the lift mechanism to “free-fall,” leaving the rider susceptible to severe injury or death.

The regulatory groups and manufacturers appear to have overlooked problems associated with an unexpected failure of a forklift’s mast tilt mechanism, which also operates with hydraulic cylinders.

A forklift’s tilt angle averages 3º forward and 3º backwards from center. The distance of lateral travel at the top of a fully raised mast is approximately six feet (varies according to maximum lift-mechanism height and maximum tilt angle)

An unexpected failure of a tilt cylinder hose or mechanical part could result in a very serious accident. For example, a forklift is being used to elevate a person to a height in a building to replace a broken light bulb. While the person is working overhead one of the hydraulic hoses in the tilt cylinder circuit unexpectedly fails causing the mast assembly to lurch forward uncontrollably throwing the lift mechanism against the structure. The person cannot be thrown from the device because, according to OSHA regulation, he/she is securely harnessed. However, his/her body is thrown against the side of an adjacent structure violently, which could cause severe injury or death.



7. Don’t be fooled by dual cylinders! –
People who don’t fully understand how a forklift’s hydraulic system works might be led to believe that two cylinders provide a “safety net” i.e., in the event of a transmission line failure and certain types of mechanical failures in one cylinder, the “good” cylinder will keep the platform upright.

Not true! The transmission lines, which supply oil to the cylinders, are connected in parallel (Figure 3). This simply means that the failure of ANY transmission line which transports oil between the control valve and the cylinders will result in a total loss of that systems motion control leaving the rider’s fate up to the laws of gravity!


The same applies to certain types of unexpected mechanical failures.

CONCLUSION -
Based on the fact that every facet of the fluid power industry is unregulated, i.e., component repair and overhaul, flexible hose construction, mechanic’s training, forklift maintenance standards, etc., I cannot agree with the regulatory group’s and manufacturer’s decision to permit forklifts to be used as “substitutions” for aerial platforms, and thus offer the following warning:

"Using a forklift as a 'work platform' is inherently dangerous and can lead to accidents, which could result in severe injury, death, and/or substantial property damage."

The regulatory groups and manufacturers appear to have ignored critical safety elements in their haste to cow-tow to industry. There are, and will always be, inherent risks associated with using a forklift for any other purpose than what it’s designers intended it to be – a cargo carrying vehicle - unless, of course, it undergoes an extensive design change and incorporates all the “bells and whistles” needed to make it “fail-safe.”

Moreover, it is high time the regulatory groups and manufacturers focused on the pathetic state of forklift, crane, and aerial lift maintenance training – to mention just a few areas that need urgent attention!

It doesn’t take a “rocket scientist” to figure out that regardless of how well a vehicle driver is trained, his/her safety, and the safety of those who work around the equipment, lies squarely on the shoulders of the maintenance mechanic.

A forklift is as safe and reliable as the people who service and repair it, regardless of how well the operator is trained!

I invited (via e-mail) two major forklift manufacturers to participate in this safety alert, specifically on the issue of descent rates in the event of an unexpected failure. To-date, they have ignored my attempt to open dialogue on these critical issues:

Toyota - no comment (e-mail sent 10/18/07)
Hyster - no comment (e-mail sent 10/18/07)

NOTE: Since writing this blog I learned about an incident in which a worker was using an aerial platform in the course of doing his work. While performing the work, one of the tilt cylinder’s flexible transmission lines unexpectedly failed causing the mast assembly to surge forward several feet, and stop abruptly causing the worker to be thrown “overboard.” Fortunately, he was wearing a harness, which from all accounts, saved his life.

Copyright Rory S. McLaren