Here
is a report of yet another mechanic that suffered a debilitating oil injection
injury but, as usual, the mechanic, not the machine designer, shoulders the
blame:
Here
are the ridiculous, and unrealistic, statements under sub-heading
“Recommendations.”
“At the time of the repair,
the mechanic had not consulted the specific manual for this machine to
determine the proper procedure to dissipate oil pressure throughout the
system.”
FACT:
There were no procedures in the manual for dissipating oil pressure in the
system.
“During
the accident investigation, the manual still could not be located. As increased
technology has complicated shut-down procedures (the addition of hydraulic
accumulators for example), no assumptions can be made, and a generic shut-down
procedure should not be trusted.”
FACT: There is no such a thing as a “generic shutdown
procedure” for a hydraulic system.
“Machine-specific
owners’ manuals should be readily available and consulted prior to undertaking
repairs.”
FACT: Machine specific owners’ manuals DO NOT provide
information about how to determine if, after shutdown, a hydraulic system
contains stored energy. Moreover, even if a person could determine if a
hydraulic system contains a lethal amount of stored energy, there is no safe
way to remove it.
“When
searching for hydraulic leaks and servicing charged systems, heavy gloves will
provide additional protection for the hands.”
FACT: There are no gloves currently available that will
protect a worker from an oil injection injury.
This
accident epitomizes the disparity between OSHA's standard (Control of Hazardous
Energy (Lockout/Tagout) (29 CFR 1910.147), and the reality of the
situation.
Here
are a few excerpts from OSHA’s Control
of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) 29 CFR 1910.147:
• This standard
covers the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment in which the
unexpected energization or start up of the machines or equipment, or release of
stored energy, could harm employees. This standard establishes minimum
performance requirements for the control of such hazardous energy.
FACT: Less than 1% of
the hydraulic systems operating in the USA meet the minimum performance
requirements for the control of hydraulic energy.
• This standard applies to the control of energy during servicing
and/or maintenance of machines and equipment.
FACT: The standard may apply to other forms of energy, but it in
no way, shape, or form applies to hydraulic energy.
• Energy control program. The employer shall establish a program consisting of energy
control procedures, employee training and periodic inspections to ensure that
before any employee performs any servicing or maintenance on a machine or
equipment where the unexpected energizing, startup or release of stored energy
could occur and cause injury, the machine or equipment shall be isolated from
the energy source and rendered inoperative.
FACT: Not only do ALL employers fail to establish a program
consisting of energy control procedures for hydraulic systems, they couldn’t
even if they wanted to, because hydraulic systems are not designed to
facilitate the controlled release of stored energy.
• How do I know if the OSHA standard applies to me?
If your employees service or maintain machines
where the unexpected startup, energization, or the release of stored energy
could cause injury, the standard likely applies to you.
FACT: The standard does apply to you if you work
on hydraulic systems. As you can see from this accident, you and your
colleagues are highly susceptible to this type of accident because both your employer,
and OSHA, ignore the problem.
• The standard applies to all sources of energy,
including, but not limited to: mechanical, electrical, hydraulic,
pneumatic, chemical, and thermal energy.
FACT: While OSHA’s Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) 29 CFR 1910.147 applies to all sources of
energy, including hydraulic energy, both your employer, and OSHA, ignore the
fact that less then 1% of the hydraulic systems operating in the USA, Canada,
Australia, Europe, et al, can be de-energized after shut down.
My recommendation: NEVER loosen a hydraulic
connector, or remove a hydraulic component, unless you can verify if the
hydraulic system you are working on contains stored energy. In all likelihood
it does, and there is no safe way to remove it.
Since your employer and OSHA ignore the problem,
the only thing left for you to do, is to refuse to work on a hydraulic system
if you have any doubt that it contains stored energy.
Here is a video of an accident I filmed while
conducting a hydraulic cylinder performance test:
The accident is identical to subject accident in
which the victim suffered an oil injection injury. The victim in this accident performed the
identical procedure described in the subject accident. As you can see from the
video, the victim was fortunate in that the explosion was deflected toward the
machine’s cab.
Post accident I installed a Safe-T-Bleed connector
in the line, and repeated the procedure. The lowest pressure I could achieve
after following the manufacturers‘ (Doosan) recommendations, was 500-PSI: a
pressure well into the territory that could cause you to suffer a debilitating
oil injection injury, and even cause you to lose your life.
The information in this blog applies to ALL industrial and mobile hydraulic systems - no exceptions! Before you work on any hydraulic system, read the
respective manufacturers’ warnings about the consequences of discharging high-pressure
hydraulic oil to atmosphere. Then, ask the respective manufacturer’s
engineering department to write your company a letter stating that post shut
down the entire hydraulic system on machine model XXXX de-energizes, and is thus
completely safe to work on. Until you receive the letter, keep your hands, eyes and body away from hydraulic systems!
I share because I care.
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